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RENTAL REAL ESTATE CORPORATIONS AND
SECTION 341 (e) (3) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
WILLIAM P. OBERNDORFER*
T. HOWARD SPAINHOUR*
MICHAEL E. OVERTON" *
I. INCORPORATION AS A FORCED CHOICE
Advantages of Noncorporate Ownership
Tax attributes inherent in the financing, construction and operation
of rental real estate frequently make partnership and individual owner-
ship clearly preferable to corporate ownership. The bulk, if not the
entirety, of the cost of such enterprises is lent by outsiders rather than
contributed by the owners. Because of the nature of mortgage loan
amortization-equal installments consisting initially of large interest
payments and relatively small repayments of principal, followed by
small interest payments and substantially larger principal repayments-
there is a heavy shifting of deductible interest expense from the later
to the earlier years of the life span of the operation. This shifting of
expense is augmented by the use of accelerated depreciation methods.
The paradoxical result is a flow of available cash from rental opera-
tions, coupled with recurrent net operating losses during the first years
of tenancy. Additional cash may be available from "excess mortgage
proceeds." It is possible at times in arranging the permanent financing
of a rental property for the borrower to obtain a loan equal to or in
excess of the property's cost if it has a higher fair market value on com-
pletion. In such a case, he is said to have "mortgaged out," and if the
borrowing exceeds cost, he has excess mortgage proceeds.
When an enterprise of this nature has been undertaken by an indi-
vidual or partnership, this cash flow, whether from operations or excess
mortgage proceeds, can be absorbed by the entrepreneurs at no imme-
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diate tax cost.' The operating losses generated will be available as offsets
to the owner's ordinary income from other sources.
The income statement of a typical partnership owning a garden-type




Other expenses 150,000.00 (325,000.00)
Net Loss ($ 50,000.00)
Observe, however, that notwithstanding a net loss which the partners
could take on their individual income tax returns against their other
income, they could pocket cash in the amount of $50,000 (rental receipts
of $275,000 minus actual disbursements of $225,000). While the dis-
tribution to a partner of his share of the $50,000 cash would effect a
reduction in the basis of his partnership interest, if the distribution did
not exceed such basis (which would include his proportionate share
of the partnership debt incurred to finance the project) the distribution
would have no immediate tax consequence to him.
The interposition of a corporate entity destroys these advantages.
The corporation will be able to make use of early years' operating
losses only if, when, and to the extent it can carry them forward against
future earnings. While there will be no corporate taxes to pay in the
early years, any amount distributed to a shareholder out of the cor-
poration's cash flow will be taxable to the extent such amount exceeds
the recipients basis for his shares.3 At best, such excess will be taxed as
capital gain. However, it is not only possible but highly probable that
1. Ultimately the recipient of excess mortgage proceeds will incur a tax cost as he
repays the loan with after-tax dollars. If he disposes of the property other than by
gift while it is still subject to an indebtedness in excess of basis, he will be required
to recognize gain to the extent of the excess. The gain may be ordinary or capital
depending on the capacity in which the owner has held the property, i.e., as dealer or
investor. See Schlesinger, Disposition of Property Having a Negative Basis, N.Y.U.
15th IN sT. ON FED. TAx 339 (1957); Greenbaum, Effects of Mortgage Borrowing on
Real Estate: Depreciation, Basis, Etc., N.Y.U. 12th INST. ON FED. TAx. 127 (1954);
Spears, Disposing of Property Mortgaged Above Basis: Opportunities and Hazards, 12
J. oF TAx. 110 (1960).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 705, 731.
3. IrN. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301. A Subchapter S election would solve the problem
were it not for the fact that "gross receipts derived from . . . rents" constitute "passive'
investment income" for the purposes of Section 1372(e) (5).
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it will be taxed as ordinary income, given the circumstances of rental
property construction in corporate form. Such corporations are among
the special prey of section 341 of the Internal Revenue Code, dealing
with "collapsible corporations," discussed below.
In recent years, differences in non-tax in legal incidents attaching to
the various entities by which business may be conducted have been
eclipsed by distinctions in tax treatment. In selecting the proper entity
form, however, non-tax considerations have not yet become so unim-
portant as to be disregarded. Two of them are of especial pertinence at
present: the question of limited versus unlimited liability, and the in-
hibitions of the various state usury laws relative to the current money
market.
An individual proprietor or partner may limit his personal liability
by the use of appropriate exculpatory clauses in debt instruments by
which he binds himself. Liability insurance would hopefully seal the
other major corridor to unlimited liability. However, these methods of
curtailing liability may not be available under some circumstances, par-
ticularly during the construction period of a substantial real estate ven-
ture. The construction lender may be unwilling to exculpate the bor-
rower even though the permanent lender may be willing to do so, the
latter having much more in the way of security upon which to rely.
Extrahazardous conditions existing during the construction period may
adversely affect the availability and cost of adequate liability insurance
coverage. As a result, it may be desirable to carry on business in cor-
porate form, at least for the duration of construction, if the venturer
can thereby effectively limit his risk.
Another compulsion (and one over which the venturer may have little
control) towards incorporation is provided by today's tight money
market. Rising interest rates have made the maximums allowed by state
usury statutes unreasonably low. Consequently, the lending institution,
if it is to obtain a reasonable return on its money, must lend to corporate
borrowers who are exempted under many local usury laws. Thus in-
corporation becomes a prerequisite to financing.'
There is a body of federal tax law to the effect that certain corpora-
tions-so-called "nominee corporations"-are too insubstantial to be
treated as taxable entities.5 The protection afforded by these cases is,
4. Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAWYER 333 (1967).
Legislation enacted at the 1968 session of the General Assembly should alleviate the
problem in Virginia.
5. Paymer v. Commissiorler, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Seattle Hardware v. Squire,
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however, a narrow one. The corporation which has done no more than
hold title to property may be disregarded for tax purposes.6 One which
has engaged in any significant business activity will not be so disregarded.
What the courts regard as being significant business activity may be as
little as the making of a note, the giving of a mortgage, the receipt of
rent payments, or the making of leases.7
It is extremely unlikely that persons engaged in the construction and
operation of rental property, who have selected the corporate form as
the result of one of the dictates discussed above, will succeed in having
their choice disregarded for tax purposes. A lending institution, ad-
vancing money at a rate in excess of that allowed by the local usury
statute on the strength of the corporate borrower's being deprived of
the usury defense, must be sure that the loan is in fact and in substance
a loan to a corporation." Otherwise, the lender may be held to have
been a party to a sham for avoidance of the usury laws.9 To give the
transaction proper substance, the lender should negotiate the loan di-
rectly with the corporation, make the loan to the corporation, take
property owned by the corporation as security, and receive its mortgage
or deed of trust from the corporation. 10 A stockholder who wishes to
83 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Wash. 1948); John A. Mulligan, 16 T.C. 1489 (1951); Moro
Realty Holding, 25 B.T.A. 1135 (1932).
6. Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cit. 1945); John A. Mulligan, 16 T.C.
1489 (1951); Moro Realty Holding, 25 B.T.A. 1135 (1932); Stewart Forshay, 20 B.T.A.
537 (1930).
7. Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Commissioner v. State-
Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cit. 1960); Abraham S. Halprin, 154 F.2d 112 (2d Cit.
1946); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Love v. U.S., 96 F.2d
919 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
8. See Leader v. Dinkler Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 283 N;Y.S.2d 281 (Ct.
App. 1967); 418 Trading Corp. v. Oconefsky, 37 Misc.2d 745, 234 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup.
Ct. 1962), aff'd, 240 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1963), afl'd, 14 N.Y.2d 676, 198 N.E.2d
907 (1964).
9. 418 Trading Corp. v. Oconefsky, 37 Misc.2d 745, 234 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
afl'd, 240 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 676, 198 N.E.2d 907 (1964).
10. Leader v. Dinkler Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Ct. App.
1967); 418 Trading Corp. v. Oconefsky, 37 Misc.2d 745, 234 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct.
1962), aff'd, 240 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 676, 198 NE.2d 907
(1964). An additional sophistication, one which results in more stringent application
of the usury laws, is imposed in some states:
In jurisdictions where this approach is followed, the critical question is to
what extent the lender is permitted to know of and to participate in the new
corporation's formation. If a borrower knows that he will be unable to
secure a loan within the statutory limit as an individual and consequently
presents himself to the lender in corporate form, the lender obviously
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
avoid personal liability on a loan to his corporation must see that the
loan is in fact and substance one to his corporation," which actually
receives and expends the proceeds. For the same reason a shareholder
will not be able to avoid all personal responsibility for construction
accidents unless the construction was indeed carried out by a valid and
subsisting corporate entity.12
Upon the completion of construction and the closing of the perma-
nent loan, the corporate framework will have outlived its usefulness.
The shareholders will then wish to hold the completed property in such
manner as to give them direct access to the cash flow and operating
losses it can be expected to engender.
Section 333
There will be no hope that the corporation will be regarded as a mere
nominee for tax purposes. Consequently, in order to place the rental
property in individual or partnership hands, a distribution subject to
the provisions of Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code will have
to be made.13 If there has been no appreciation in the value of the prop-
erty, such a distribution, whether by corporate liquidation or otherwise,
will present no problem. However, absence of appreciation is unlikely.
In all probability the property will be worth somewhat more than the
amount of cash put into it. As a result, the distribution, if one is dared,
will have to be one in complete liquidation qualifying under section 3 3 3,
the one-month liquidation provision.
cannot be charged with cloaking an individual loan as a corporate loan in
order to evade the usury laws: he knows nothing about it. Where the
borrower appears at the lender's office as an individual and suggests that he
is looking for a loan for a corporation which he intends to form, this
transaction would probably, although not certainly, escape condemnation.
... In any case where the suggestion of incorporation comes from the
lender, the transaction is unquestionably in danger in those jurisdictions
which indicate that they will not permit the use of a corporate form to
shield from the usury laws a loan made in substance to an individual bor-
rower.
Shanks, Practical Problens in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L
REv. 327, 345 (1967).
11. See I FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CoRoRATIoNS, §§ 41-46 (1931).
12. See 13a FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, § 6214 (1931).
13. In all probability, a purported "sale" by a corporation to its shareholders of
rental property constituting substantially all of its assets would be regarded as a sharm
The transaction would be treated as being in reality a liquidation of the corporatior
productive (by virtue of the collapsible provision) of ordinary income to the dis
tributees.
[Vol. 9:972
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Section 333 provides for the substantially tax-free liquidation of cor-
porations having little or no earnings, and assets consisting for the most
part of property which is not cash or securities acquired since 1953.
Gain ,recognition is imposed only to the extent the corporation has earn-
ings and profits and/or cash and post-1953 securities. If none of these
exist, the distributee recognizes no gain and takes the property received
at the same basis he had for the shares surrendered. To the extent the
distributee is forced to recognize gain because the liquidating corpora-
tion held cash or post-1953 securities, he is allowed an increased basis
for the non-cash property received. 4 If he receives cash, his basis for
other property is reduced by that amount. For example, X Corporation
owns a tract of land worth $1,000, no securities, and $100 in cash, and
has accumulated undistributed earnings of $50. Y, its sole shareholder,
has a basis of $500 for his shares. Thus, on liquidation Y will realize a
gain of $600 ($1,000 worth of land plus $100 in cash minus $500 basis).
However, because of the nonrecognition provisions of section 333, he
will recognize only $100 of his gain [larger of cash ($100) plus post-
1953 securities (none), or earnings and profits ($50)]. The recognized
gain on such liquidations may be either ordinary or capital. In the case
of the X Corporation liquidation, $50 of Y's gain will be ordinary in-
come because his ratable share of X's earnings and profits are in that
amount. The remaining $50 of Y's gain, representing the excess of cash
and post-1953 securities over Y's earnings and profits, is capital. Y's
basis for the tract of land will be $500 [basis of shares surrendered
($500) plus gain recognized ($100) minus cash received ($100)].
Not only is a one-month liquidation advisable because it will make
possible the transfer at minimum immediate tax cost, but its choice is
compelled by other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The re-
mainder of this paper will be devoted to explaining why the choice is
so limited and with what success section 333 can be employed.
Collapsible Corporations
The major limitation is section 341, the collapsible corporation pro-
vision. The background against which this section was enacted is too
well-known and too well-chronicled elsewhere to justify any lengthy
discussion here."0 The law was passed to prevent the use of the cor-
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334(c).
15. See, e.g., BITTKER AND EusTiCE, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION OF CORPORATTONS AND,
SHAREHoLDERS 416-418 (2d ed. 1966). Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible
1968]
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porate form as a device for the conversion of ordinary incomt into
capital gain. This transmutation of the base into the rare and precious
was accomplished by using a corporation for the carrying out of ac-
tivities such as the construction of real property improvements or the
filming of a movie.16 These endeavors would have produced ordinary
income if performed by the individual proprietor (or by the corpora-
tion as well, if the corporation carried through and sold or operated the
constructed asset). When the corporation had completed its productive
activities, its shareholders would take advantage of the capital gain pro-
visions by selling their stock or liquidating the corporation. Section 341
prevents this alchemic mutation by reconverting to ordinary income
what would otherwise be capital gain on such sales or liquidations.
Subsection (b), the definitional part of section 341, states that a col-
lapsible corporation is one
... formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, con-
struction or production of property . . . with a view to . . . the
sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquida-
tion or otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, before the
realization by the corporation manufacturing, constructing [or]
producing. . . the property of a substantial part of the taxable in-
come to be derived from such property, and . . . the realization
by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property.17
Subsection (a), the operational part, provides that gain from the sale
or exchange of stock in, or a distribution in partial or complete liquida-
tion of, or a dividend distribution made by, a collapsible corporation
. .. to the extent that it would be considered (but for the provi-
sions of this section) as gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset held for more than 6 months shall, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, be considered as gain from the sale or ex-
change of property which is not a capital asset.
By its terms, subsection (a) acts only to convert what would other-
-wise be capital gain into ordinary income, and not to create gain or
Partnerships, 12th So. CAL. TAX IN ST. 269 (1960); Tax Management Portfolio No. 29
AI-A3 (1964).
16. A classic example is provided by Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 .(1955).
17. Collapsible property may also have been purchased by the corporation as wel
as manufactured, constructed or produced, provided the purchased property fits withir
the definition set forth in Section 341(b)(3).
Vol. 9:972
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to impose its realization. For this reason, prior to 1954 a one-month
liquidation carried out under section 333's 1939 Code predecessor"" was,
unless it produced capital gain, outside the ambit of collapsible treat-
ment."'9 In 1954, the statutory provision for one-month liquidations,
theretofore enacted only for short periods at irregular intervals, was for
the first time made a permanent part of the Internal Revenue Code.2"
Simultaneously, the section, renumbered 333, was amended by the in-
sertion of a parenthetical phrase limiting its application to domestic cor-
porations "(other than a collapsible corporation to which section 341 (a)
applies)." 21
In consequence of the parenthetical limitation, real estate operators
who wish to end the inconvenience of an interposed corporate entity
by means of a one-month liquidation must reckon with section 341. The
corporation to be abolished, if originally created for one of the reasons
outlined above, would certainly have been availed of principally for the
construction of property. In many cases the shareholders will have in-
corporated with the intention of liquidating at the earliest opportunity.
Here the existence of the necessary "view" will be irrefutable.2 Even
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (7).
19. MacLean, Collapsible Corporation-Statutes and Regulations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 55,.
85 (1953).
20. Legislative history gives no inkling as to whether more than coincidence was
behind the fact that section 333 was, by virtue of the enactment of the 1954 Code,
simultaneously made a permanent feature of the Code and subjected to collapsible treat-
ment. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 256 (1954) and H. REP. No. 2543,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). The writers can only speculate that prior to 1954,'
the one month provision was available on too limited and irregular a basis to be a
dependable vehicle for long-term tax planning, with the result that, regardless of the
inapplicability of the collapsible provision, it posed no threat to the fisc; but upon its
becoming a permanent part of the Code, collapsible treatment was dictated.
21. Note that section 333 is not available to a "collapsible corporation to which
section 341(a) applies." Compare section 337(c)(1) which makes section 337 inap-
plicable to "a collapsible corporation (as defined in section 341(b))."
22. In what sense can the shareholders of a putative collapsible corporation, in con-
templating a one month liquidation, be said to have had "a view to . . . the realization
o.. Of gain"? What they have a view to doing (assuming the corporation has no
cash or securities acquired after 1953) is merely changing the legal mode in which
they hold their property, without the slightest expectancy of gain in the conventional
sense or in the sense of taxable income. Any gain involved would be imposed by the
tax collector, much against the will of the shareholders. This argument, unfortunately;.
runs afoul of section 1001, one of the Code's most fundamental provisions. Section,
1001 makes it clear that gain is "realized" whenever one asset is exchanged for another,
the "gain" being measured by the excess of the fair market value of the asset received
over the basis of that surrendered. The provisions are perfectly applicable to an. ex-
change of. shares for the assets of a close corporation. Section 1001's sister provision, is;
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where liquidation has been carried out as an afterthought, it will be
difficult to escape the Commissioner's regulations to the effect that the
necessary "view" has existed if the liquidation "was contemplated, un-
conditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized possibility,"23 at any
time during the construction of the property, and, further, that
.. if the sale, exchange or distribution is attributable to circum-
stances present at the time of the manufacture, construction, pro-
duction, or purchase, the corporation shall, in the absence of com-
pelling facts to the contrary, be considered to have been so formed
or availed of.2
4
If there is any appreciation in the value of the property, any view to
the liquidation of its corporate owner would of necessity be equivalent
to a view to the realization of gain.2
The conditional clause of section 341, requiring the sale or distribu-
tion to have been made "before the realization by the corporation ...
of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from [the]
property," will be of small comfort to the shareholder of a rental prop-
erty corporation. Because of the heavy shifting of deductible expenses
to the early years of a rental operation, the property will have to be
held and operated a lengthy period before a "substantial part of the..
income to be derived" will have been recognized as taxable income.
-1
section 1002 which provides that gain realized shall be gain recognized for tax purpose
"[eixcept as otherwise provided in the Code." Thus, it appears that the phrase "reali
zation of gain" is a term of art as used in the Internal Revenue Code and has a meanini
distinct from any given it in conventional usage.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (2) (1968), which also provides that:
The existence of a bona fide business reason for doing business in the
corporate form does not, by itself, negate the fact that the corporation may
also have been formed or availed of with a view to the action described
in section 341(b).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1968).
25. See footnote 22, supra.
26. Must the corporation have realized a substantial part of the potential incom
to be realized or all but an insubstantial part of the property's income potential? Th(
circuits appear to be split on this question with the Court of Appeals for the Fift]
Circuit holding one way, and the Tenth Circuit the other. Commissioner v. Zongker
334 F.2d 44 (10th Cit. 1964); Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961); Com
missioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961). In regard to this question, th
Service's position, as might be expected, is that the "all but an insubstantial part" interpre
tation is the correct one, as expressed, for example, in Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 CU1
Bum. 321. According to BITTKER AN) EusTIcE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CoRPRo.
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 430 (2d ed. 1966). ". . . it is understood that the service wil
[Vol. 9:972
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Section 341 (d)
The only other limits to the application of section 341 are to be found
in subsections (d), (e) and (f). Subsection (d) offers three possible al-
ternatives. Section 341 "shall not apply" to a shareholder unless he owns
more than five percent "in value of the outstanding stock of the cor-
poration." Nor shall it apply to "gain recognized during a taxable year
(with respect to stock in a collapsible corporation), unless more than
70 percent of such gain is attributable to ... [collapsible] property."
Finally, subsection (d) makes section 341 inapplicable to "gain realized
after the expiration of 3 years following the completion of ...con-
struction." Unfortunately, none of the relief provisions offered by sub-
section (d) give any real assistance to the rental property operator who
has to cope with the problem herein sketched.
Section 341 (d) (1) can be ruled out at the start. It will not often be
the case that any substantial part of the stock of a corporation set up for
the construction of rental property will be held in blocks of five percent
or less.21
Paragraph (2), which provides that collapsible treatment will not
apply unless more than seventy percent of the shareholder's gain for the
year "with respect to his stock in a collapsible corporation" is attrib-
utable to the "property so manufactured, constructed, produced, or
purchased . . .," has little more to offer. We are concerned with the
fairly common situation of a corporation created for the construction
(and in some cases the operation) of a single integrated rental project,
such as a shopping center, an apartment or office building, or a complex
of apartment units. Typically, the corporation will own no assets of
any substance other than the property constructed and the land on
which it rests. Reliance on paragraph (2) may prove dangerous since
the Commissioner would undoubtedly argue that the gain on liquida-
tion is attributable entirely to constructed, and therefore clearly col-
lapsible, property."
rule favorably on the status of collapsibility, if 85% of the income from collapsible
property has been realized."
27. For a thorough discussion of the shortcomings of section 341 (d) see Goldstein,
Section 341(d) and (e)-A Journey Into Never-Never Land, 10 VILL. L. REv. 215
(1965).
28. Each of the shareholders having five percent or less in value of the shares of the
putative collapsible corporation would, of course, be protected, but those holding
more would still be in danger.
29. It is not the purpose of this discussion to delve into the questions of whether
1968]
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In order to take advantage of section 341(d)(3) the taxpayer will
have to wait at least three years after he completes "such manufacture,
construction, production, or purchase." Its protection will thus entail
the loss of at least three years of tax benefits (particularly the deduction
or carry-over of the operating losses) which would have accrued to an
individual or partnership, often a substantial portion of the total of such
tax benefits to be derived. 0
The determination of when the three-year period is to commence is
no easy matter. The concept of "completion" as applied to a construc-
tion project is an intractable and vexing one at best. Cases decided and
Revenue Rulings promulgated, respecting the time when construction
is deemed to have ended, have held, to cite a few examples, that the
construction of a shopping cnter is not complete until rezoning litiga-
tion is concluded favorably, successful rezoning being "an integral step"
in its construction;31 that an apartment project has not been finished,
the "property so constructed" encompasses the land as well as the improvements thereon
or whether a distinction should be made as to gain attributable to a general rise in
land value without regard to the construction activities. On this, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.341-4(c) (2) (1968), Bixrr AND EUSMrE, supra note 36, at 433; Short v. Com-
missioner, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962); Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.
1960); Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); Glickman v. Commissioner,
256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958). Cf. Wheeler Kelly and Hagney Investment Company v.
The United States (64-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 9260, U.S.D.C., Kan.), wherein one of the
judge's instructions to the jury was
. . . the principal question in this case is whether Midland Industrial Prop-
erties, Inc., was a collapsible corporation. In addition to this, -however,
there is one collateral issue. This issue is whether at least 30% of the total
gain realized by plaintiff was due to general appreciation in market values
of land unaffected by anything done to the land in question by Midland
Industrial Properties, Inc. A special question on this matter will be given
to you to answer.
The jury answered the special question in the affirmative. The case was not appealed.
30. As an illustration, assume the following facts to exist with regard to an apart-
ment building owned by an individual: the building has a useful life of forty years;
it cost $1,000,000 to build; it was financed entirely by a twenty-five-year mortgage
loan at seven percent; depreciation deductions are computed under the double declining
balance system.
During the twenty-five-year period over which the mortgage will be paid, interest
expense deductions totaling $1,121,000 will become available. Of this amount, $205,120,
or about 18.3 percent, will be incurred during the first three years following the
closing of the permanent loan. Of the $1,000,000 in depreciation deductions which the
original,owner will be able to take if he retains the property for its entire useful life of
forty years, $142,625, or better than fourteen percent, will be available the first three
years.
31. Rev..Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 178.
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even though physical construction is substantially complete and a cer-
tificate of occupancy has been issued by the local authorities, so long
as much of the landscaping remains to be done and the Federal Housing
Administration has not made its final inspection; 2 and that a shopping
center has not been completed when a planned retaining wall has not
been erected and the parking lot and driveways have not been black-
topped.33
The general position of the Internal Revenue Service in this regard
seems to be that particular activities will constitute "construction" if
the result of such activities is an increase in the area available for rental,
a change in the character of the structure, an appreciable increase in its
fair market value, or an increase in the net income that can be realized
from the project.3 4
If the activities of the corporation to be liquidated have encompassed
the construction and serial completion of a group of separate units com-
prising a unified project, and the first completed goes into operation well
before the completion of the last, the requisite three year period would
run, nonetheless, from the latest completion date. 5
If the property concerned is a shopping center, it would not be at all
uncommon for the owner, at the instance of a prospective tenant, to
-engage in substantial new construction activity, such as remodeling, with
an increase in the fair market and rental value of the property as a
probable result. This could occur long after the construction of the
building was thought to be complete in any conventional sense. Never-
theless, the running of the three-year period will not begin until the
later completion of the reconstruction.16
Subsection (d) having in large measure failed him, the taxpayer has
only subsections (e) and (f) left to rely on. The latter is clearly of no
benefit, pertaining only to stock sales. Consequently, subsection (e)
may well be the only practical avenue for avoidance of collapsible treat-
ment.
32. Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
33. Weil v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 809 (1957).
34. Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963-1 CuM. BuLL. 74.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (4). While the regulation has specific relation to
whether a substantial part of a project's potential income has been realized, it would
also appear to be pertinent to the fixing of a completion date.
36. Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 74.
19681
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
II. SUBSECTION (E): SOLUTION OR DELUSION?
The enactment of subsection (e) was for a remedial purpose. The
effect of the collapsible provision as originally enacted went far beyond
its original intent. Not only was an avenue of tax avoidance through the
conversion of ordinary income into capital gain foreclosed, but persons
who would otherwise have been entitled to capital gains treatment re-
gardless of the use of a corporate entity were penalized by the imposi-
tion of the ordinary rate.3 7
Our rental property builder and operator clearly falls within the class
intended to be benefited by subsection (e). He has elected a corporate
entity solely for nontax reasons. By so electing he has in fact incurred
unfavorable tax consequences. In liquidating his real estate corporation
he will merely be attempting to retrieve the tax advantages of individual
ownership which he is forced to forego as the result of a corporate elec-
tion imposed upon him by construction period circumstances. If such a
taxpayer seeks to restore his position by means of a one-month liquida-
37. S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1958), states in part that:
The collapsible-corporation provisions of the present law . . . both by
their terms and as interpreted, are so broad that in any number of situations
they may have exactly the opposite effect from that intended-instead of
preventing the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, they may
instead convert what would otherwise be capital gain into ordinary
income. The applicability of the provisions of present law, moreover,
depends upon the subjective intent of the parties, a matter which is obviously
difficult to determine. Furthermore, if the collapsible-corporation provisions
do apply, the entire gain of the shareholder is taxed at ordinary income
rates, notwithstanding the fact that had the shareholder not employed the
corporate entity a large part of his gain might have been taxed at capital-
gain rates. For these reasons, the collapsible-corporation provisions of
present law frequently impede or prevent legitimate business transactions
and in some cases even result in the imposition of ordinary income taxes
which would not be imposed if the shareholders of such corporations had
not employed the corporate method of doing business ....
... [The limitations set forth in Section 341(d)] do not eliminate the
problems described above. For example, in the case of corporations engaged
in the development of natural resources, which have continued development
activity, the shareholders of such corporations can never be certain that
their stock interests in such corporations will not be regarded as stock
interests in a collapsible corporation, notwithstanding the fact that their
corporations have little or no inventories and that the properties of such
corporations (if sold by the corporation or by the shareholders) would
be regarded as properties the sale of which would result in capital gain.
Similarly, real-estate corporations established by investors (as distinguished
from dealers) holding rental property for investment only may be re-
garded as collapsible corporations under present law. [Emphasis supplied]
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don under section 333, but in doing so runs afoul of the collapsible
provision, the bitter consequence is not only the conversion of capital
gain into ordinary income but the creation of ordinary income where
otherwise there would have been no taxable income at all.
In enacting subsection (e), Congress was sympathizing with the in-
vestor rather than the dealer. The subsection is in essence an elaborate
system by means of which the one is to be sorted from the other. In
keeping with the older portions of section 341, it is at once very me-
chanical and highly subjective. The relief provided by section 341 (e)
is available only in regard to an outright stock sale pursuant to subsec-
tion (e) (i), a liquidation under subsection (e) (2) in which section 337
applies pursuant to subsection (e) (4), or a one-month liquidation under
section 333 pursuant to subsection (e) (3). Other liquidations, whether
complete or partial, as well as distributions subject to section 301 and
stock redemptions, are unprotected.
Of the three privileged transactions, only the one-month liquidation
will be of any assistance to the rental property owner and operator
described in this paper. A sale of stock under subsection (e) (1) is ob-
viously irrelevant. While, taken together, subsections (e) (2) and (e)
(4) permit a section 337 liquidation free of collapsible treatment, they
do so only if substantially all the corporate property is sold to outsiders
within the twelve-month period. Moreover, under subsection (e) (4),
following the adoption of a plan of liquidation pursuant to section 337,
no distribution of depreciable property (which clearly would include
the apartment project) may be made by the corporation to any stock-
holder. Accordingly, any hope of divesting the rental project of its
corporate jacket is completely frustrated if subsection (e) (2) must be
relied on.
On the other hand, given the essential happy circumstances, the re-
luctant incorporator may, under section 333, liquidate his corporation
and, section 341 notwithstanding, be free of any gain as a result of ap-
preciation in the value of the project. Subsection (e) (3) is his source
of succor. Under that short, ostensibly simple subsection, for purposes
of section 333, a corporation is not considered a collapsible corporation
if at all times after the adoption of a section 3 3 3 plan of liquidation, the
net unrealized appreciation in "subsection (e) assets" of the corporation
does not exceed an amount equal to fifteen percent of the net worth of
the corporation.
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Both "net unrealized appreciation" 38 and "net worth" 19 are defined ir
the statute. Both are apparently simple terms. Yet the computation ol
each depends on the valuation of corporate properties. The fixing ol
market values thus called for is an inherently inexact and debatabk
process with the result that it is difficult to foresee what valuation tht
Internal Revenue Service will accept or seek to impose. Consequently
when reliance is to be placed on a given ratio of net unrealized apprecia-
tion to net worth, a wide margin for error must be allowed.
Moreover, it is likely that, at the time the liquidation is to be accom-
plished, the net unrealized appreciation in the typical project will exceec
fifteen percent of the net worth of the corporation (particularly in viex
of the fact that the debt/equity ratio in such a corporation is normall)
very high), or that the risk inherent in establishing a value for th
property will be greater than the taxpayer is willing to assume.
Accordingly, the real question-the one whose answer may provid(
a solution-is not whether the project has appreciated too much, bul
whether it is a "subsection (e) asset." For if the project is not a sub-
section (e) asset, there is nothing on which to compute unrealized ap-
preciation, there can be no net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e)
assets and there can be no problem. The corporation may be liquidatec
comfortably under section 333 irrespective of the amount of apprecia-
tion in the non-subsection (e) rental project. This is true even if then
is excess mortgage money in the corporate till. The liquidating distribu-
tion of the money may result in the recognition of gain under sectior
333, but, absent subsection (e) assets, the corporation will not be con-
sidered collapsible.
"Subsection (e) assets," relative to one-month liquidations purportinf
to qualify under subsection (e) (3), are, in general, those assets of th(
corporation which, if sold at a gain by the corporation or by any actua
or constructive shareholder who is considered to own more than fiv
percent in value of the outstanding stock, would result in the realizatiot
of ordinary income.40 Although oversimplified, the foregoing definitiot
contains two concepts which may not be apparent, but which, at thi
juncture, should be absorbed and thereafter respected. It is not enougi
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 341(e) (6).
39. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 341 (e) (7).
40. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (5). Section 341(e) (12) provides that sectior
617(d) (1), 1245(a) and 1250(a) are to be disregarded only for the limited purpos
therein stated and does not preclude the recognition of ordinary income by th
corporation pursuant to those sections.
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for the property to be a non-ordinary income asset in the hands of the
corporation; it must be assumed to be owned by each more-than-five-
percent shareholder. If any such shareholder is a dealer in the type of
property involved, it is probably a subsection (e) asset, and if there is
a more-than-fifteen-percent-of-net-worth appreciation in all subsection
(e) assets, the benefits of section 333 will not be available to any of the
shareholders. It is an all or none proposition. Moreover, as will be dis-
cussed below in more detail, a property may suffer the subsection (e)
taint as a result of the dealer status of a "constructive shareholder."
The nature of subsection (e) assets is illustrated by the following
example. The outstanding stock of X Corporation is owned 75% by A,
15% by B and 10% by C. The corporation owns no property except
an apartment house on which unrealized appreciation is $20,000. The
net worth of the corporation is $100,000. In the hands of B, but not in
the hands of A or C, the apartment house would be property held pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness. The shareholders of X Corporation wish to avail themselves of
section 333. Since, in the hands of B, a more-than-five-percent share-
holder, the apartment house would be held primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, it is a subsection
(e) asset. Therefore, since the net unrealized appreciation in subsection
(e) assets ($20,000) exceeds fifteen percent of net worth ($15,000),
no shareholder of the corporation may qualify under section 341 (e) (3)
for the use of section 333. However, if B were not a more-than-five-
percent shareholder of the corporation, or if in his hands the apartment
house would not be held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business, then all shareholders of the corporation
could qualify under section 341(e) (3) for use of section 333 since the
apartment house would not be a subsection (e) asset.
For the purposes of section 333, the detailed statutory' definition of
subsection (e) assets extends to four categories of property held by a
corporation described respectively in clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of
section 341 (e) (5) (A), as modified by section 341 (e) (5) (B). Section
341 (e) (5) is difficult and burdensome to read, much less to comprehend
and retain. Nonetheless, escape from classification thereunder often be-
ing the sine qua non of qualification under subsection (e), it is essential
to examine and mentally digest the categories. The fourth category
[clause (iv)] involves copyrights and similar artistic properties and is
not pertinent to this discussion.
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Three Categories of Subsection (e) Assets
(i) The first category consists of all property (except property de-
scribed in section 1231(b), without regard to any holding period pre-
scribed therein) which in the hands of the corporation is, or, in the
hands of any actual or constructive shareholder who is considered tc
own more than five precent in value of the outstanding stock of the
corporation (such a shareholder hereafter called a "pertinent share-
holder") would be, property gain from the sale or exchange of which,
under any provision of Chapter 1 of the Code (other than section 1245,
1250 or 617(d) (1)), would be considered in whole or in part as gain
from the sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset
nor property described in section 1231 (b).
In the case of our incorporated apartment project (or shopping cen-
ter or similar venture), any question of classification as a category (i)
subsection (e) asset can be dismissed at the outset as to any property
which can be shown to be described in section 1231 (b), without regard
to holding period, irrespective of the capacity in which a shareholdei
hypothetically might be deemed to hold it. On the other hand, if the
corporation holds any property for sale in the ordinary course of in
business, then such property falls in category (i) as a subsection (e)
asset with equal disregard to any shareholder's assumed holding. If, how-
ever, the corporation holds the property neither for sale in the ordinary
course of its trade or business nor for use in its trade or business, the
activities of each pertinent shareholder become highly relevant in test-
ing its status under category (i). A property held by a corporatior
neither for sale nor use (with certain exceptions) would be a capital
asset.4' Under such circumstances, the question is whether the same
property, hypothetically projected into the hands of any pertinent share-
holder, is a capital asset or property described in section 1231(b). If it
is neither, it is a subsection (e) asset.
Where the corporation is an active rental property corporation, the
"shareholder reference test" [as the regulations have designated the de-
termination of subsection (e) status by reference to how each pertinent
shareholder would have held the property had he held it) 42 become
moot for purposes of the category (i) definition. The corporation cer-
tainly will be found to hold the apartment building (or shopping center)
41. INT. REv. CoDn OF 1954, S 1221.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(b) (4).
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for use in its trade or business within the meaning of section 1231(b),
in which case it will not be within the purview of category (i).
(ii) This category of subsection (e) assets is confined to property
which in the hands of the corporation is property described in section
1231(b) (without regard to any holding period prescribed therein),
but only if there is net unrealized depreciation on all such property.
The shareholder reference test is never pertinent to the category (ii)
determination. All property used in the corporation's trade or business
must be examined to determine whether "unrealized depreciation" on
all such properties having unrealized depreciation exceeds "unrealized
appreciation" on all such properties having unrealized appreciation. Un-
realized depreciation exists in the case of such properties with fair
market values less than their adjusted bases; unrealized appreciation
exists in the case of such properties with fair market values larger than
their adjusted bases. If unrealized depreciation does exceed unrealized
appreciation, then all properties used in the corporation's trade or busi-
ness are subsection (e) assets under this category, whether appreciated
or depreciated. If unrealized appreciation exceeds unrealized deprecia-
tion, category (ii) is simply inapplicable.
An apartment building or similar property used in the trade or busi-
ness of a corporation is scarcely likely to have "depreciated" to a fair
market value below its adjusted basis at the time a one-month liquidation
of that corporation under the umbrella of section 341 (e) is contem-
plated. Absent such depreciation, the apartment or other such property
will not be a subsection (e) asset under category (ii).
(iii) The third category of subsection (e) assets applies only if there
is net unrealized appreciation on all property which in the hands of the
corporation is property described in section 1231(b) (without regard
to any holding period prescribed therein). If category (iii) so applies,
any such property (whether appreciated or depreciated) is a subsection
(e) asset if a sale or exchange thereof by any pertinent shareholder
would produce ordinary income.
Category (iii) requires two independent inquiries. The first involves
the threshold question of applicability and necessitates the identical com-
putation used in determining the pertinence of category (ii). If un-
realized depreciation exceeds unrealized appreciation, category (ii) ap-
plies and category (iii) is disregarded. If the reverse, only category
(iii) is considered. But if category (iii) is pertinent, the shareholder
reference test, which is ignored under category (ii), must be made.
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Consequently, under category (iii), not all appreciated and depreciate(
assets used in the corporation's trade or business will enter into the ulti.
mate computation of the critical fifteen percent. Only those whict
become subsection (e) assets by virtue of the shareholder referenc(
test, whether bearing unrealized appreciation or depreciation, will b(
considered. This may lead to some rather peculiar results.
For example, assume that a corporation owns (in addition to certak
other properties found under category (i) to be subsection (e) assets
an apartment building on which there is unrealized depreciation o
$9,000; in addition, the corporation owns a parcel of land which has ,
fair market value of $30,000 and an adjusted basis of $20,000 and whicl
in the corporation's hands is property described in section 1231(b)
Since the corporation's property bears net unrealized appreciation o:
$1,000, category (iii), and not category (ii), is applicable. Assume fur.
ther that the sole shareholder holds land, but not rental properties, pri
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi.
ness. Therefore, the apartment building is not a subsection (e) asset
However, since in the hands of the shareholder, the land would bi
productive of ordinary income, the land is a subsection (e) asset. Con
sequently, the net unrealized depreciation on the apartment building i
ignored, but the entire $10,000 unrealized appreciation on the land wil
be taken into account in computing the net unrealized appreciation (i
any) in all the corporation's subsection (e) assets.
Reverse the arithmetic and assume that there is unrealized apprecia
tion of $10,000 on the apartment building and unrealized depreciatioi
of $9,000 on the land. Since there is net unrealized appreciation, cate
gory (iii) is again applicable and the shareholder reference test mus
be made. Again, only the land will be a subsection (e) asset. Unrealize(
appreciation in the apartment building will, as a result, be entirely dis
regarded, while the unrealized depreciation in the land will be availabl
in full as an offset to unrealized appreciation on the corporation's othe
subsection (e) assets.
Generally, the incorporated apartment project or similar venture i
safe under category (iii) unless a pertinent shareholder is a dealer ii
such projects. However, even if no such shareholder is a dealer, ther,
appears to be a question whether the contemplated section 333 liquida
tion will bring the desired results if improperly timed. Several question
may be asked: Is it necessary that the corporation hold the apartmen
project for any particular length of time before adopting a plan o
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liquidation under section 333? Must each pertinent shareholder have a
minimum holding period for the project? If the answer to the latter
question is in the affirmative, must the holding period be an actual one
or a hypothesized one, and if hypothesized how is it to be determined?
It seems clear that (unless it is necessary from the shareholder point
of view) the corporation does not need any particular holding period.
At the corporate level, category (iii) relates to "all property used in
the trade or business (as defined in paragraph (9));" and section 341
(e) (9) expressly refers to property used in the trade or business "with-
out regard to any holding period."
Unfortunately, the answer is not so clear with respect to a pertinent
shareholder. In order to avoid subsection (e) asset classification under
category (iii), the property in the hands of the pertinent shareholder
must be property gain from the sale or exchange of which would be
considered gain from the sale or exchange of property which is neither
a capital asset nor property described in section 1231 (b). In the hands
of the pertinent shareholder, the project will be either property held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the shareholder's trade
or business, 43 or a capital asset,44 or property used in the shareholder's
trade or business. 4 For purposes of this discussion, we will assume that
the apartment project is neither property held for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the shareholder's trade or business nor a capital
asset. By elimination, therefore, it must be property used in the share-
holder's trade or business. 46 However, under the literal language of the
statute, being property used in the shareholder's trade or business will
43. Property other than real estate can fall into additional categories. For example, sec-
tion 1221 (1) defines a capital asset as excluding not only property held primarily for
sale but also "stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer. . . ." However, in the case of
an apartment project, the stock in trade and inventory categories undoubtedly would
be academic and will be disregarded.
44. If the apartment project is considered to be a capital asset, no holding period
is required under category (iii).
45. If so used, the apartment project would not be a capital asset. See INT. REv. CoDE
oF 1959, § 1221(2).
46. It would perhaps be more accurate to assume, in the first instance, that the
project is property used in the shareholder's trade or business, thereby eliminating it as
a capital asset, rather than first to assume that it is not a capital asset, for in all likeli-
hood (the pertinent shareholder not being in the business of selling apartment projects)
the project will be considered property used in his trade or business rather than a
capital asset. The intent to develop an apartment project for rent would seem sufficient
to so characterize the project even prior to the commencement of rental activities. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-133, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 277.
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not suffice-it must be property described in section 1231 (b); and prop-
erty described in section 1231 (b) is property used in the trade or busi-
ness "held for more than 6 months." Thus a literal reading of the statute
suggests that a more-than-six-months' holding period is required, al-
though nothing else in the statute or in the regulations offers any words
of wisdom respecting this problem.4 7
If such a holding period is necessary, it would seem manifest that it
must be a hypothetical, rather than an actual, holding period. In the
case of a stock sale under section 341 (e) (1), or a section 337 sale and
liquidation under section 341(e) (2) and (4), there can be no actual
holding period in the hands of a pertinent shareholder for the reason
that the pertinent shareholder never actually holds the property. Nor
in the case of a section 3 3 3 liquidation will a constructive shareholder
actually hold the property. Nevertheless, the category (iii) definition
of subsection (e) assets must be applied in all such cases. Accordingly,
if such a holding period is in fact necessary, then not only must the
property be imagined in the hands of each pertinent shareholder but it
must be imagined there for more than six months. In determining the
imaginary period, it would be reasonable to suppose that the property
has been in the hands of each pertinent shareholder for the same length
of time it has been in the hands of the corporation. If this is so, it
would seem possible to avoid the problem by having the corporation
defer the adoption of a plan of liquidation pursuant to section 333 to
a date more than six months after the completion of the project. 9
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(b) states that included in category (iii) is property which
in the hands of a pertinent shareholder would be property used in his trade or business
"held for not more than 6 months," possibly suggesting thereby that the Commissioner
regards a holding period as necessary. However, the example given by the Commis-
sioner as an illustration contains no reference to a holding period.
48. Query: What is the shareholder's holding period if his shares of stock in the
corporation have been held for a longer or shorter period than the corporation's
holding period for the property?
49. Thus, if a corporation buys a tract of land and constructs a store thereon, com-
pleting it on April 1, 1968, it could be unsafe for the corporation to adopt a plan of
liquidation under section 333 prior to October 2, 1968. The holding period for the land
would run from the date of acquisition, but for the building the holding period would
run on a piecemeal basis, depending upon how much of the store had been completed
and how much remained incomplete on April 1, 1968. Commissioner v. Williams, 256 F.2d
152 (5th Cir. 1958); Paul v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1953); Draper v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 545 (1959); DiZeno v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. 677 (1964).
If any portion of the store failed to meet a holding period requirement, the store would
be a subsection (e) asset, but only the unrealized appreciation on the portion of the
store held for six months or less would have to be taken into account-presumably on
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The "Constructive Sbarebolder"
As previously stated, for purposes of determining whether an asset is
a subsection (e) asset, such asset must be examined not only as if owned
by each actual more-than-five-percent shareholder, but also as if owned
by each person who owns the requisite percentage by virtue of attribu-
tion from another actual or constructive shareholder. This attribution
of stock from one shareholder to another extends in two directions. It
can cause an actual-but-five-percent-or-less shareholder to become a
more-than-five-percent shareholder. For example, if A and his grand-
father each actually owns three percent in value of the stock of an
apartment house corporation, A will be considered to own his grand-
father's shares and thus will be a six percent shareholder; his activities
may cause the apartment house to be a subsection (e) asset for purposes
of section 341 (e) (3). Moreover, attribution can cause a nonshareholder
to be regarded as an actual shareholder. For example, if in the same
corporation H(husband), a dealer in apartment houses, owns no stock,
but W(wife) actually owns more than five percent in value of the cor-
poration's stock, AW's shares will be attributed to H. Thus, nonshare-
holders' activities may taint the property.
The mechanics of constructive ownership are not apparent to the
cursory reader. The subsection (e) asset definition sections [341 (e) (5)
(A) (i) and (iii) ] merely refer to "a shareholder." The researcher must
look five paragraphs beyond, to section 341(e) (10), to find that for
purposes of "this subsection [i.e., section 341 (e)], the ownership of
stock shall be determined in the manner prescribed in subsection (d)
[i.e., section 341 (d) I." Subsection (d) prescribes rules for determining
stock ownership; and it is by this prescription that a bitter pill is com-
pounded for those seeking the remedy of subsection (e). It not only
incorporates all the rules for imputed stock ownership set forth in sec-
tion 455 (a) (relating to personal holding companies) but supplements
them. The result is probably the most expansive constructive ownership
provision in the Code.
Shareholders, partners and beneficiaries constructively own propor-
tionate parts of shares owned by corporations, partnerships, trusts and
estates. Partners constructively own shares owned by their partners. An
individual constructively owns shares held by his spouse, lineal descen-
a prorated basis. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (6) (D). Any requisite holding
period must antedate the adoption of the plan of liquidation rather than the distribution
in liquidation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (3).
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dants, ancestors, brothers, sisters, spouses of brothers or sisters, or spouses
of lineal descendants. An optionee contructively owns the shares subject
to his option. There may also be reattribution under some circum-
stances.
The consequence is that each shareholder must consider not only his
own dealership status, but that of family members and partners, and, in
addition, that of his fellow shareholders, their business associates and
relatives. If a shareholder is an artificial person, its owners and bene-
ficiaries must all be examined for the taint of dealership. Thus it appears
that in order to take advantage of subsection (e) a shareholder will have
to be on intimate terms with the family and business affairs of all the
other people who own stock in his corporation. And the results in some
circumstances may be bizarre indeed. If one shareholder's grandson, of
whose very existence the other shareholders are completely ignorant, is
subject to classification as a dealer, the result might well be the dis-
qualification of the transaction as to all.
III. A CASE STUDY
Some of the concepts which have been discussed can best be illustrated
by the story of A-E Corporation. A-E Corporation so recently com-
pleted the construction of a small shopping center that it has not yet
gone into operation. Having expended its entire capital and mortgage
money on land and buildings, A-E Corporation has no asset other than
the shopping center, and no liability other than the $490,000 mortgage
indebtedness to which the shopping center is subject. The property has
a cost basis of $500,000 and is now worth $600,000. The net worth of
the corporation [as defined in section 341 (e) (7)] is $110,000. All the
stock of A-E Corporation is owned in five equal shares by four individ-
uals, Alpha, Beta, Delta and Epsilon, and a trust established under the
will of one Gamma, deceased.
Alpha, a nonentity if ever there was one, has no interest in any real
estate venture of any sort, either as a partner, shareholder or individual,
other than his interest in A-E Corporation. He is unmarried and has no
living relatives. He owns no corporate shares, other than his shares in
A-E, and holds no options to acquire any corporate shares. He is not
the beneficiary of any trust or estate and is not a member of any part-
nership. In short, circumstances completely insulate him from the effects
of constructive ownership, other than as applied to his fellow share-
holders.
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Beta has a wife and relatives but none is engaged in any -real estate
activities. He is a physician and a member of a partnership organized
solely for the practice of medicine. However, one of his partners, an-
other physician, has a son who is extensively engaged in the real estate
business, selling various types of property including shopping centers.
Gamma, deceased, provided in his will for the creation of a trust, the
sole beneficiary of which was to be his granddaughter. He died shortly
after the incorporation of A-E, about two years ago. Since then his
estate has been wound up and the trust has been established. All Gam-
ma's shares in A-E were transferred from his estate to the trust. Also,
subsequent to Gamma's death was the marriage of his granddaughter
to Sigma, an extremely active buyer-builder-and-seller of commercial
property, including shopping centers.
Neither Delta nor his relatives or business associates are subject to
classification as dealers unless the activities of Delta's three wholly-
owned corporations are attributed to him. Each of the three corpora-
tions is active in the construction and sale of commercial property.
Epsilon is a member of a partnership actively engaged in the business
of developing residential subdivisions and selling lots and houses. The
partnership has never dealt in commercial property.
All the shareholders wish to liquidate A-E Corporation under section
333. Indeed the venture was undertaken with the mutual understanding
that it would be liquidated at the earliest possible time. On dissolution
the property will be transferred to a partnership formed by the five
shareholders (trading as ABGD & E) which will hold and operate the
property.
The question is, then, whether section 341 (e) will permit the- share-
holders to effectuate a one-month liquidation under section 333? Did
the draftsmen of section 341(e) propose fair terms with a villain's
mind? Is the shopping center subsection (e) property, or is it not?
Status In Hands of Corporation
Before delving into the shareholder reference test, we must consider
in what capacity A-E Corporation itself holds the shopping center. A-E
Corporation must hold it either as a dealer for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of its business or, in the language of sections 1221 and
1231, as "property ... used in [its] trade or business," or as a capital
asset.
If the first, a sale of the shopping center by A-E Corporation would
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produce ordinary income, and the shopping center is a subsection (e)
asset. The cases in which this type of question has been considered have
invariably involved situations in which the property had in fact been
sold. If we are to apply the principles of those cases to A-E Corpora-
tion, it is necessary to speculate on what A-E Corporation would have
done had it continued to hold the property rather than distribute it to
the shareholders.
The factors given most weight in determining whether an asset
is held for sale, for use in a business or as a capital asset, both for
and against the taxpayer, do not ordinarily come into existence until the
property owner has established some substantial experience in its opera-
tion or until a sale has actually been made. Generally speaking, two
factors are determinative: the manner in which the taxpayer used the
property while he owned it, and the circumstances surrounding its sale,
the latter generally being given somewhat greater weight.50 Some per-
tinent questions are: Was the property rented for a substantial period
and was it productive of substantial income during that period?"' Was
the property sold on account of some supervening and unforeseen event
such as the imposition of rent control, or a drastic decline in the number
of people interested in renting rather than buying property?5 2 Was the
sale solicited by the buyer from a passive seller? 53 Had the seller, in
fact, rejected previous offers for the property?54 Was the property un-
suitable as investment property?55 Did the property yield only nominal
income, indicating that it was rented by the owner only as a temporary
expedient, perhaps to protect the property from vandals pending the
50. This follows from the well-established principle that an owner's motive towards
his property may change and that it is his intent at the time of sale which is determina-
tive. No matter how clearly a taxpayer establishes the fact that he has held an asset
as an investment until shortly before its sale, if the circumstances surrounding the
transaction are such as to indicate that the property had been held at that time for
sale in the ordinary course of the owner's business, ordinary income treatment will be
the result. See American Can Company v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 198 (1961), Mauldin v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 42 (1957), Johnson-McReynolds v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 300
(1956).
51. Rouse v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 70 (1962).
52. Farry v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 8 (1949).
53. Phillips v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 435 (1955). However, the fact that the
purchaser was the aggressive party to the transaction standing alone is no guarantee of
success in litigation of this sort. E.g., see Rollingwood v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263
(9th Cir. 1951).
54. Crabtree v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 841 (1953).
55. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 9:972
RENTAL REAL ESTATE CORPORATIONS
appearance of a buyer?56 Was a vigorous sales effort made? 57 Did the
seller make any overt display, prior to the sale and while he was renting
the property, of a substantial sales motivation? 5'
A-E Corporation has not yet gone into operation. It may not be
necessary that the corporation actually have begun rental operations in
order for the property to be deemed an asset used in its business. But
the fact that such operations (including such preliminary efforts as ad-
vertising and employing rental agents) have not begun will deprive
A-E's shareholders of the most persuasive evidence of a holding for use
rather than sale in A-E's business. Aside from actual rental activities
carried on by A-E Corporation, the only evidence of A-E's motive in
holding the shopping center will be the testimony of the shareholders
themselves and perhaps self-serving statements in the corporation's min-
ute book.
But what of the acknowledged intention of the shareholders to liqui-
date A-E at the earliest feasible moment? Does this make it impossible
to classify the shopping center in the hands of A-E Corporation as one
held either for sale in the ordinary course of, or for use in, its business?
If so, do we have a new species of asset for purposes of tax classifica-
tion? An asset thus held by a corporation purely for distribution to its
shareholders at a propitious moment could not be said to be held by
that corporation as an investment. Neither could the asset be said to be
held for sale or use in the corporation's business. But section 1221 de-
fines what is a capital asset by stating what it is not. A capital asset is
56. Id.
57. Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952); Rollingwood v. Com-
missioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951); American Can Company v. Commissioner, 37
T.C. 198 (1961); Johnson-McReynolds v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 300 (1956).
58. Harrah v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1236 (1958), and Rollingwood v. Commissioner,
190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951): in both cases the granting of a purchase option to a
lessee in connection with the lease of property was considered significantly indicative
of a sales motivation on the part of the lessor. The Tax Court seems especially disposed
to seize on the insignificant as substantial evidence of sales motivation. See, e.g., Heller
Trust v. Commissioner, 65,302 P-H Tax Cr. Mee. (1965). The taxpayers, in filing an
application for mortgage insurance from the Federal Housing Administration in con-
nection with a proposed rental property project were required to answer, among others,
two questions phrased as follows: "Do you intend to occupy, rent, or sell this property?"
and, if for sale, what is the "proposed sale price?" The applicant answered "Rent" to
the first, provided the figure $15,750 as the answer to the second (at 1824). The court
appears to have attached considerable importance to this minimal display of a propen-
sity to sell, finding it "clear from this record (at page 1668) that they (the taxpayers)
also contemplated the profitable sale of these duplexes if it turned out to be the more
desirable course of action." (at 1827).
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any asset other than inventory-type property, property held primarily
for sale in the ordinary course of business, depreciable property and
real property used in the owner's business, copyrights and similar artistic
properties, or certain accounts, notes or obligations receivable. Argu-
ably, property held solely for distribution on liquidation fits none of the
excluded categories and must be a capital asset.
In summary, if the shopping center is not held by A-E Corporation
for sale, it could not be a subsection (e) asset vis-a-vis A-E Corporation,
whether it be deemed held for use in its business or as a capital asset.
However, before abandoning our inquiry as to the shopping center's
status in the hands of A-E Corporation, we must consider the possibility
that such status will be contaminated by post-distribution activities of
its shareholders and the application of hindsight.
Application of Hindsight
There appears to be some authority for the proposition that the post-
distribution activities of the partnership, ABGD & E, in regard to the
shopping center should be given some consideration in determining what
A-E Corporation would have done with the property had it continued
to hold it.5" The partnership would have an opportunity following the
liquidation to put the shopping center into operation, obtain substantial
income from it, and clearly establish an investment motive toward it,
refraining all the while from betraying any inclination to sell the prop-
erty. This grace period would result from the necessary time lag be-
tween the date of liquidation and the respective dates on which the
shareholders' income tax returns, reporting the liquidation, are audited,
the assessments proposed, and the matter finally resolved.
An examination of post-distribution activities requires a consideration
of the admissibility of hindsight evidence, which is what an accounting
of the partnership's post-distribution handling of the property would
constitute. Ordinarily such evidence is inadmissible.6" In regard to A-E
Corporation, the determination to be made is the state of mind of the
controlling shareholders (investment or dealership intent toward the
property) during the period ending on the date of distribution. But all
real evidence of that state of mind may come into existence only subse-
quent to the last critical date. To ignore such evidence as inadmissible
59. Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Browne v. United States,
356 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Burgher v. Campbell, 244 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1957).
60. Dabney v. Chase National Bank, 98 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
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hindsight would be to substitute "a blank slate and untested specula-
tion" for "what actually happened." 61
The rule barring hindsight evidence is subject to some exceptions.
One is applicable Where "a resort to such evidence is rendered necessarv
by the nature of the fact to be proven in that a confinement to cliff-
temporary events would result in grave injustice," 62 as, indeed, strict
adherence to the general rule would in the case of a one-month liquida-
tion of A-E Corporation. A rigid application of the general rule might,
in fact, make the purported remedy offered by subsection (e) a useless
and unworkable one, as it may well be in regard to stock sales and sec-
tion 337 liquidations in any event.63
In at least four tax cases in which ordinary versus capital gain was
the issue, courts have given consideration to events which occurred
after the critical date or the end of the critical period with reference to
which the determination sub judice was to be made.64 Three of the four
cases concerned the treatment of gain to a shareholder on his sale of
raw land to a controlled corporation. The post-transfer activities of the
corporation in subdividing, improving and selling off numerous lots were
considered by the court as evidence of the nature of the shareholder's
pre-transfer holding of the property. A determination of the nature of
A-E Corporation's holding of the shopping center by reference to the
post-liquidation activities of the ABGD & E partnership may necessitate
application of the principles enunciated in the foregoing cases.
Even if testimony in regard to the partnership's post-distribution op-
erations is admitted, the government may still argue that such evidence
should be discounted in at least some degree as having been, in a sense,
"manufactured." In other words, the government might contend that
the activities of the partnership had been tailored to conform to stat-
utory and case law requirements for the tax consequences desired. How-
ever, while the government has enjoyed some degree of success with
61. Federal Trade Com. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 602 (1965) (con-
curring opinion).
62. Dabney v. Chase National Bank, 98 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
63. See Goldstein, Sections 341(d) and (e)-A Journey Into Never-Never Land,
10 VI.L. L. REv. 215 (1965), and Axelrad, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corpora-
tions, 36 TAXES 893 (1958). Both writers are indeed pessimistic in regard to the utility
of subsection (e).
64. Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Browne v. United States,
356 F.2d 546 (Cr. Cl. 1966); Burgher v. Compbel, 244 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1957); Bernard
v. Commissioner, 67,176 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1967).
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this approach in other areas of the law,65 it could be expected at most
to weaken rather than negate the evidentiary value of post-distribution
events.
Merely by not disposing of the shopping center, ABGD & E will
deny the Internal Revenue Service the most conclusive evidence it could
obtain of dealer motivation-an actual sale and the circumstances sur-
rounding it. If the activities of the partnership subsequent to the liquida-
tion are carried out judiciously, and are considered as if performed by
A-E Corporation, the former shareholders should have no trouble in
establishing that the shopping center would not have been an asset the
sale of which would have produced ordinary income in the corpora-
tion's hands.
Shareholder Reference Tests
Assuming A-E Corporation itself to have demonstrably clean hands,
we will now examine Alpha. Since in his case none of the dealership
criteria are present and he has no guilt-by-association, his holding or
putative holding of the shopping center will not stigmatize it as a sub-
section (e) asset.
On the other hand, even if Alpha were a dealer in commercial rental
properties including shopping centers, this would not necessarily fore-
close the benefits of subsection (e). The chance of qualification in spite
of dealership is made possible by the well-established principle that a
dealer in property can also be an investor in the same or a similar type
65. Federal Trade Comm. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). In this
case the dispositive issue, in an action brought pursuant to Section 7, of the Clayton Act
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), was the probability of an adverse effect on competition as a
result of the defendant's acquisition of a competitor. The critical date in such a de-
termination is the date of merger. As of such date, and in view of contemporaneous
circumstances, can it be said that the effect of the acquisition "may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly?" The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in holding that the acquisition was not productive of the forbidden
probability, relied heavily on the post-acquisition activities of the defendant (329 F. 2d
623). On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas, in delivering
the opinion of the Court, conceded that the Court of Appeals "was not in error in
considering the post-acquisition evidence in this case," but concluded that it had been
given too much weight.
Probability of the proscribed evil is required, as we have noted. If the
post-acquisition evidence were given conclusive weight or allowed to over-
ride all probabilities, then acquisitions would go forward willy-nilly, the
parties biding their time until [the forbidden result] was allowed fully to
bloom . . . . [Tihe force of [Section] 7 is still in probabilities not in
what later transpired. (at 598).
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of property. Ordinarily, where a dealer can show that certain of
his property is held by him as an investment for the production of
current revenue or as a speculation, such property will not be classed
as stock in trade. The standards the courts have developed in determin-
ing whether a dealer is an investor as to certain of his property are simi-
lar to the criteria used in distinguishing assets held for sale from capital
assets or assets held for use in the owner's business. But the possibility
that exists, by virtue of these criteria, of segregating dealer and investor
property in the hands of a single owner, is severely curtailed by the
Commissioner's regulations. It is provided therein that for the purposes
of determining whether any property of the corporation
would, in the hands of a particular actual or constructive share-
holder, be property gain from the sale or exchange of which
would be considered in whole or in part as gain from the sale or
exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor prop-
erty described in section 1231(b), all the facts and circumstances
of the direct and indirect activities of the shareholder must be
taken into account. If the particular shareholder holds property
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business and if similar property is held by the corporation,
then in the hands of the shareholder such corporate property will
be treated as held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business.7
What is "similar" property? The regulations give no explicit example.
In the two examples given in the regulations of fact situations in which
corporate property will be deemed to be subsection (e) assets because
of a shareholder being a dealer, the property in which the shareholder
deals is not merely similar, but identical, to the property the corporation
holds. 8
The only relevant case law would appear to be that interpreting
"similar or related in service or use" as employed in section 1033.6 The
expression has been given a restrictive meaning in the various opinions
66. Eline Realty v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1 (1960); Meig v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.
1314 (1959); Farry v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 8 (1949).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(b) (4) (emphasis supplied).
68. Example (2) under Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(a) (4); Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(c) (4).
69. No case has been decided thus far involving the interpretation of "similar or
related in service or use" as used in the Hypothetical Dealer formula appearing in
Sections 341 (e) (1) (C) and 341 (e) (2) (C).
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construing it. For example, a warehouse and an apartment building
may not be "similar or related in service or use." 70
Even if a narrow construction is extended to the above-quoted regu-
lation, the italicized portion would still clearly conflict with well
settled case law. The automatic equivalency imposed by the regulations
between the dealer's motive in holding his own stock in trade and the
hypothetical motive behind his hypothetical holding of the corporation's
property is clearly at odds with the many judicial opinions which recog-
nize the fact that dealers in certain property can hold the same type of
asset as an investment. 1 There is nothing in the language of section
341 (e) to support such a departure from firmly established legal prin-
ciples. It would be particularly difficult to justify the application of
this regulatory provision where the shareholder has, for some time sub-
sequent to the period with reference to which the determination is to be
made, actually held and operated the property as an investment produc-
tive of substantial income.
Nonetheless, if Alpha held other commercial rental properties as
stock in trade at any time during the critical period, it would be a
mistake to rely on subsection (e) to immunize the transaction against
collapsible treatment. If he held other shopping centers for sale, such
a reliance would be foolhardy. The Service can be expected to enforce
the regulation no matter how invalid it may appear to be. Although
litigation may lead to a holding of invalidity, involvement in such a con-
troversy is not generally thought to be a part of acceptable tax planning.
Suppose Alpha were presently holding for sale no shopping center or
similar property, but had frequently bought and sold such property in
the past. The regulations make special provision for such a situation.
Even if the shareholder does not hold similar property during the critical
period, it
... may be determined under the particular facts and circum-
stances (taking into account ... if applicable, the fact that he pre-
viously so held similar property) that he would hold the corporate
property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade or business.7-
Thus, it appears that where the shareholder's dealings in similar prop-
erty have all been in times past, the Commissioner's regulations will
70. S. E. Ponticos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. No. 11 (1963).
71. See footnote 66, supra.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-6(b) (4).
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apply in a less draconian fashion. Room seems to be allowed under such
circumstances for an evaluation in the light of the many cases which
recognize the coexistence of dealer and investor motives in the bosom of
the same taxpayer.
In the case of a stock sale or a liquidation under section 337 which the
participants hope to shield from collapsible treatment by means of sub-
section (e), the nature of each hypothetical holding will have to be
determined on the basis of sheer surmise. This evaluation of the im-
ponderable called for by subsection (e) has been the source of the
severest criticism levelled at the provision. 3 The statutory formula of
subsection (e), according to one writer, "precipitates literally insoluble
problems." 74 A taxpayer in the position of having to satisfy the re-
quirements of this formula may have no evidence to offer in his behalf
other than his own unsupported assertions. Would the taxpayer's self-
serving and uncorroborated testimony be sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption enjoyed by the Commissioner in his findings? The Commis-
missioner may have no evidence whatever, and hence may wonder:
"How does one refute testimony concerning a hypothetical state of
mind about hypothetical property by the person whose hypothetical in-
tendon is at issue?" 75
But such criticism does not hold true in regard to a section 333 dis-
tributee. This taxpayer's holding of the property will be actual rather
than hypothetical. He will have ample opportunity to demonstrate an
investor attitude towards the property, avoiding all the while any word
or deed suggesting an inclination to sell. He may in fact be especially
advantaged relative to the taxpayer in the more typical case who has to
explain away the awkward fact that a sale has actually taken place.
In the case of Beta, it is necessary that his partner in the practice of
medicine (whose son is an active buyer-and-seller of commercial rental
property, including shopping centers) be able to bear scrutiny. We
have already hypothesized Beta's partner to be a non-dealer. However,
we must consider the effects of reattribution. Happily for the A-E
shareholders, the reattribution rules will not reattribute shares held by
Beta's partner (because of the partner-to-partner rule) to Beta's partner's
son (because of the family member rule), the fortunate consequence
being that the son of Beta's partner will not be a constructive share-
73. See footnote 63, supra.
74. Axelrad, supra note 15, at 386.
75. Axelrad, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corporations, TAxEs 893, 914 (1958).
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holder of the corporation and will not have to suffer the humiliating
shareholder reference test."
On the other hand, if the A-E shares had been owned by the partner-
ship itself, there would be attribution from it to the partners in amounts
proportionate to their partnership interest. Reattribution would then
apply to make a portion of the shares the constructive property of
Beta's partner's son, and the son would be deemed a constructive share-
holder of A-E Corporation, with the result that his activities would
probably cause the shopping center to be a subsection (e) asset2
In regard to the Gamma Trust and its sole beneficiary the deceased
Gamma's granddaughter, the owners of A-E Corporation are less fortu-
nate. Here reattribution applies.18 The trust's shares become successively
the beneficiary's, then her spouse's. As a result, Sigma, the real estate
dealer, becomes a constructive shareholder. Here, criticism of the hypo-
thetical nature of the determination which has to be made strikes home
with full force. In evaluating the status of a shopping center in the
hands of Sigma, hypothetical ownership of the property of the corpora-
tion is piled on hypothetical ownership of stock in the corporation.
It may seem unfair to disqualify the liquidation of A-E Corporation
on account of Sigma's activities, since the highly conjectural nature of
his holding may make it impossible to show that Sigma would have
held the property, if he had held it, as an investment. However, the
literal language of the statute seems clearly to call for it. The problem
may well be an insoluble one. As a result, it seems advisable for anyone
having such a relative, or a fellow shareholder who has such a relative,
to forego reliance on subsection (e).
If Delta, who wholly owns the three active real estate corporations,
76. Paragraph (2) of Section 554(a) provides that "An individual shall be considered
as owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his family or by or
for his partner." Paragraph (5) further provides that
. . . stock constructively owned by a person by reason of the application
of paragraph (1) [pertaining to the attribution of shares held by a corpora-
tion, partnership, trust or estate, to its shareholders, partners and bene-
ficiaries in proportionate amounts] or (3) [which makes an option to
acquire shares in a corporation equivalent to ownership of the shares] shall
for purposes of applying paragraph (1) or (2), be treated as actually
owned by such person; but stock constructively owned by an individual
by reason of the application of paragraph (2) shall not be treated as
owned by him for purposes of again applying such paragraph in order to
make another the constructive owner of such stock.
77. See footnote 76, stpra.
78. See footnote 76, supra.
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has engaged in no dealership activities himself, and is not afflicted with
any relatives or business associates who are themselves dealers in real
estate, the shopping center will not be tainted as a result of his interest.
There is no back attribution under section 544(e) (1) or any other
constructive ownership provision applicable to subsection (e). Conse-
quently, none of the three corporations will be a constructive share-
holder in A-E Corporation, unless some principle of case law requires or
allows an imputation of these corporate activities to Delta for this pur-
pose. No such principle appears to be applicable here.
The law is quite well settled that ordinarily the separate taxable
entities of corporation and shareholder will be respected.79 Except under
certain special circumstances, the activities of the one will not be at-
tributed to the other, providing, of course, that the corporation is
not treated as a sham and its separate entity disregarded in conse-
quence.80
There appear to be four legal theories by virtue of which the separate
corporate entity, though not a sham, may to some extent be disregarded
in determining whether activities are to be imputed from the corporation
to the shareholder or vice versa. In some cases, corporate activities have
been attributed to a shareholder because the corporation could fairly
be regarded as the shareholder's agent. An example is presented by the
shareholder who enters into a contract with his corporation whereby
the latter undertakes to construct houses on lots to which the share-
holder himself retains title, the shareholder subsequently having the
corporation act as his sales agent for the lots after they have been im-
proved.81
In other cases a corporation-to-shareholder imputation has been made
because of the interrelated and coordinated manner in which the cor-
poration and individual have conducted their activities; that is to say,
where neither can be said to be agent of the other but the two have acted
somewhat like joint venturers, e.g., where an individual acquires a parcel
of land for development and deeds a portion of it to his wholly-owned
corporation, retaining the remainder, the two then cooperating in such
matters as accomplishing necessary rezoning, providing for sewage and
water, and proceeding to develop the adjacent parcels pursuant to a uni-
79. Burnett v. Clark. 287 U.S. 410 (1932); Goldberg v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d (D.C.
Cir. 1929); Gordy v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 855 (1961); Jarvis v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.
173 (1959).
80. See footnote 5, supra. See also Haberman Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 305 F.2d 787 (8th
Cir. 1962) and the cases cited and discussed therein.
81. Kaltreider v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir. 1958).
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form plan.82 As previously discussed, courts have given consideration to
the subsequent activities of a corporation as an aid in determining what
the purpose of its majority shareholders had been in holding real prop-
erty prior to its transfer to the corporation, more particularly, whether
or not the shareholders held land as an investment or for sale in the
ordinary course of their business.
Finally, there have been decisions in which corporate activities have at
least been mentioned in determining whether or not a shareholder is a
dealer in real estate.m However, substantial personal real estate activity
on the part of the shareholder under scrutiny was involved in such cases.
A major limitation on the applicability of all the foregoing theories,
other than the last stated, is the fact that without exception they have
been applied in litigation relating to transactions in which the corporation
has had a direct involvement, either as joint venturer, agent or transferee.
In none of the cases applying any of the first three theories has the cor-
poration's activities been unrelated to the transaction in question and
relevant only because of the taxpayer's ownership and control.
We have already hypothesized Delta to have engaged in no personal
dealer activities. We further assume that none of the three corporations
is so insubstantial as to be disregarded as a mere sham. Consequently, if
none has acted as Delta's agent or joint venturer with regard to the
activities of the A-E Corporation, the shopping center will not be an
ordinary asset in Delta's hands.
Epsilon will have to establish that the property in his hands would be
an investment rather than a part of his residential dealership business.
This is true regardless of his carrying on no dealer activities as an indi-
vidual other than through the partnership to which he belongs. The entity
concept as applied to partnerships for tax purposes has been called a
"skin deep accounting expediency." 84 The independent existence of the
partnership entity, as distinct and separate from that of the partner, is
accorded much less deference by the courts than the more religiously ob-
served concept of the corporation as a person distinct from its share-
82. While the precise facts stated were not present in either case, Tibbals v. U.S.,
362 F. 2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966) and Burgher v. Campbell, 244 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1957) are
both suggestive of this approach.
83. See, e.g., Murray v. Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 762 (1965).
84. Rabkin and Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws-, 55 HAv. L.
REv. 909, 915 (1942).
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holders. 85 The partner is generally regarded as being individually in
the business of his partnership.86
Does a single isolated sale of commercial property by a dealer in resi-
dential property escape being a sale in the ordinary course of business
solely because of the difference in character between the residential
property in which he customarily deals and the single commercial prop-
erty he sold? On this point the law is at best unclear. Unsurprisingly, no
court ever appears to have been confronted with a fact situation present-
ing this problem in its pure form, uncomplicated by other, usually
weightier, factors. Consequently, such authority as exists on this question
is little more than dicta. There is, however, some authority, admittedly
flimsy and by implication only, to the effect that a single sale of unim-
proved land by a seller who otherwise deals only in improved realty is
not in the ordinary course of his business, provided the unimproved
land was not acquired by him for the original purpose of improve-
ment prior to sale, and was not a portion of a larger parcel the re-
mainder of which was improved and then sold. r
We can, however, find no decision favorable to a taxpayer solely on
the ground of a difference in nature between the property in which he
had normally dealt and a single piece of another type that he had sold.
No fixed formula exists for determining which property is held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a tax-
payer's business. Rather, a congeries of factors is to be considered
and weighed, no one factor being necessarily decisive. 8
In many cases won by taxpayers, where the dispositive issue was
whether the taxpayer had held certain property for sale in the ordinary
course of business, an important factor was a strong element of dissimi-
larity between the property sold and other property held by the tax-
payer as a dealer. This element was always accompanied by other
factors indicating an investment motive towards the property sold,
such as past refusals to sell or substantial rental income from the prop-
erty. Nonetheless, such a dissimilarity is a point in favor of the tax-
85. MFrrNs, LAw oF FEDERAL TAxATioN, S 30.26 at 68. Welch v. Commissioner, 19
B.T.A. 394 (1930).
86. Id.
87. Evwalt Developement [sic] Corporation v. Commissioner, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
220 (1963), Olivieri v. Commissioner, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 920 (1966), Kesicki v.
Com., 34 T.C. 675 (1960).
88. Cashvan v. U.S., 67-2 U.S.T.C. Para. 9513 (E.D., Va.).
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payer and it will be of assistance to Epsilon under the facts hypothesized.
It will emphasize the segregation he must establish (and demonstrate
to a court if necessary) between the residential' property in which he
deals and the shopping center which he asserts he holds as an invest-
ment."' Moreover, dissimilarity will make inapplicable the Commission-
er's regulation, previously discussed, to the effect that an item of cor-
porate property, hypothesized to be in the hands of a particular share-
holder who is a dealer in that or "similar" property, is a subsection (e)
asset per se.90
IV. EPILOGUE
It has been said that "life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions
from insufficient premises." By resorting to hypothesis we have en-
deavored to generate sufficient premises to support our conclusions.
However, premises are variable and unlimited, and there are other ques-
tions and, hopefully, other answers.
One such variation raises the possibility that a distributee may under
some circumstances recognize capital gain or ordinary income in a one-
month liquidation, while at the same time receiving a stepped-up basis
for any depreciable property he receives. This would not be true under
the facts hypothesized above for A-E Corporation. But suppose, con-
trary to the example, A-E Corporation found it necessary to invest only
$400,000 in purchasing land and constructing the shopping center which
now has a value of $500,000. Its balance sheet, after construction, and
before going into operation, would then read as follows:
Cash $100,000 Mortgage





On liquidation each of the five shareholders would realize gain in
the amount of $20,000 ($100,000 in cash and other property with a fair
market value of $500,000, minus indebtedness to which the property is
subject in the amount of $490,000, divided by five, the number of dis-
tributees, minus $2,000, the basis of each shareholder's shares in the cor-
poration). Because of the $100,000 cash distribution, all of the gain
89. For an example of how such a dissimilarity facilitates the establishment of the
required degree of segregation, see Grace v. Commissioner, 20 Tax Ct. Mem. 1313 (1961).
90. Regulations Section 1-341-6(b) (4). Treas. Reg. § 1-341-6(b) (4).
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realized would have to be recognized. 1 But since the liquidating corpor-
ation would have no earnings history, all can be recognized at the capital
gains rate, absent the application of section 341 (a).92
On liquidation, the basis for each one-fifth undivided interest would
be increased from $80,000 to $100,000 ($98,000, the proportionate part
of the total indebtedness on the property applicable to each one-fifth
interest, plus $20,000, the amount of gain recognized, minus $20,000,
the amount of cash received, plus $2,000, the basis of each shareholder
for his shares) .9 The same basis would carry over to ABGD & E.94 In
other words, the basis of the property in the hands of A-E Corporation
in the amount of $400,000 would be increased to a basis of $500,000
in the hands of the partnership. Taxes on a total of $100,000 would be
paid at the capital gains rate by the shareholders, and an additional
$100,000 in basis would be available to charge off in the form of depreci-
ation deductions against future ordinary income. The same result would
obtain if the shopping center had become subject to an indebtedness in
excess of its basis as a result of subsequent borrowings rather than the
initial financing or as the result of the taking of accelerated depreciation.
This type of transaction, by which an increased basis for depreciable
property is obtained at the cost of a capital gains tax, is illustrative of
what section 341 is said to have been intended to prevent.95 However,
91. Sections 333(e) (1) and (2) provide in substance that gain realized by a non-
corporate recipient shall be recognized to the extent of his "ratable share" of the
liquidating corporaticn's earnings and profits, and if he receives cash and/or securities
acquired by the corporation after December 31, 1953, in excess of such ratable share, to
the extent of such excess.
92. Section 333(e) (2) prescribes capital gains treatment for cash and post-1953 se-
curities received by a noncorporate shareholder in excess of his "ratable share" of the
liquidating corporation's earnings and profits.
93. Basis in the hands of a recipient in a Section 333 liquidation is determined by
Section 334(c), which states that the basis of such property "shall be the same as the
basis of such stock cancelled or redeemed in the liquidation, decreased in the amount
of any money received by the shareholder, and increased in the amount of gain
recognized to him." No provision is made in the statute for indebtedness, either assumed
by the distributee or subject to which he receives the property. However, Regulation
Section 1.334-2 provides that the basis of property received in a one-month liquidation
shall be determined by subtracting from the basis of the shares surrendered the amount
of any cash received, and by adding recognized gain and "the amount of the un-
secured, liabilities assumed by the stockholders," and, further, to the basis thus de-
termined "for each property against which there is a lien, [there] should be added
the amount of such lien . . . . Whether the mortgage indebtedness is assumed by the
shareholders or the property is taken subject to the mortgage is immaterial."
94. IN-r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 723.
95. See Boland, Collapsible Corporations Under the 19M Amendments, 17 TAx L.
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there is nothing whatever in the language of subsection (e) to preclude
its applicability to one-month liquidations which are productive of
capital gains. Nonetheless, at least until a few decided cases make it
possible to predict how subsection (e) will be applied to a given fact
situation, it would seem advisable not to lend added incentive to the
Internal Revenue Service to press for the application of section 341 (a),
or, should the matter wind up in litigation, to so flavor the decisional
context as to unfavorably influence the court's findings of fact, particu-
larly where one or more of the shareholders is on the interpretive verge
of dealership.
It is hoped that the foregoing account of subsection (e) prospects
has not been unduly optimistic. The purported amnesty of the subsec-
tion must be viewed as through a glass darkly. It should probably not
be relied upon other than in a very simple fact situation such as we have
hypothesized here." Our analysis of subsection (e) in terms of its appli-
cation to a one-asset corporation with an unusually high debt-equity ratio
has obviated the necessity of wrestling with the concepts of net un-
realized appreciation and net worth as used in the subsection. The one
asset is either a subsection (e) asset or it is not. We have assumed that,
if it is, the critical percentage of net worth has been exceeded and that
the only way A-E Corporation can avoid collapsible corporation treat-
ment is by a determination that its sole asset is not a subsection (e) asset.
No corporation should undertake a one-month liquidation in reliance
on subsection (e) without a careful analysis of the factors outlined above
as applied to the facts peculiar to the predicament in which it finds it-
self. Because of the present lack of any case decided or revenue ruling
promulgated under the subsection, the preceding discussion has been
highly speculative. It would be rash for anyone other than the most
favorably situated group of shareholders-a group (including its con-
structive members) found upon careful study to include no dealers-to
place major reliance on subsection (e). A real estate investor confronted
with a problem of this nature can only console himself with Mr. Justice
Holmes' stoic dictum: "Certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not
the destiny of man."
Rav. 203; and Tax Management Portfolio No. 49, Collapsible Corporations-Special
Exceptions, at A24.
96. Because of its "unforgivable complexity," subsection (e) "cannot be considered
a significant contribution to the resolution of problems posed by collapsible corpora-
tions since its utility is necessarily limited to the most simple of factual situations."
Tritt, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corporations, 19th So. CAL. TAX INST. 143,
156 (1967).
[Vol. 9:9721010
